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INTRODUCTION

New Jersey law provides a broad range of protections for the
approximately 4.4 million members of New Jersey’s civilian
workforce. 1 These statutory provisions describe the rights and
responsibilities of both employers and employees in a number of
different employment contexts. Tenure policies, for example,
“are a highly structured and monitored portion of the general
education law, embodied in N.J.S.A. 18A:28-1 to -18.” 2 New
Jersey tenure laws ”provide not only for the creation of rights
of tenure, but also how they may be lost.” 3
New Jersey’s Unemployment Compensation Act affords
additional protections to workers, which the New Jersey Supreme
Court has described as “a cushion for the workers of New Jersey
‘against the shocks and rigors of unemployment.’” 4 The court
further described the purpose of the Act as providing “‘some
income for the worker earning nothing, because he is out of
work through no fault or act of his own. ’” 5
Additionally,
“[f]or
more
than
a
century,
the Workers’ Compensation Act has provided employees injured
in
the
workplace
‘medical
treatment
and
limited compensation “without regard to the negligence of
the employer.”’”6
The Act requires that municipalities
provide

*Laura C. Tharney has been a licensed attorney since 1991 and is admitted to
practice in New Jersey and New York; she is a graduate of the Rutgers Law
School—Newark. Samuel M. Silver has been a licensed attorney since 1994 and is
admitted to practice in New Jersey; he is a graduate of the Washington College of
Law—American University and earned an LL.M. in Advocacy from Stetson
University College of Law. Whitney G. Schlimbach has been a licensed attorney
since 2012 and is admitted to practice in New Jersey and New York; she is a
graduate of Brooklyn Law School. Karyn L. White has been a licensed attorney
since 1995 and is admitted to practice in New Jersey and Pennsylvania; she is a
graduate of the University of Pittsburgh Law School.
1 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economy at a Glance: New
Jersey, available at https://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.nj.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2022).
2 Lammers v. Bd. of Educ., 134 N.J. 264, 273 (N.J. 1993).
3 Lange v. Bd. of Educ., 26 N.J. Super. 83, 88 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953).
4 Brady v. Bd. of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 212 (N.J. 1997) (quoting Carpet Remnant
Warehouse v. N.J. Dep’t of Labor, 125 N.J. 567, 581 (N.J. 1991) (citing Provident
Inst. for Sav. v. Div. of Emp. Sec., 32 N.J. 585, 590 (N.J. 1960))).
5 Brady, 152 N.J. at 212 (1997) (quoting Yardville Supply Co. v. Bd. of Rev.,
114 N.J. 371, 375 (N.J. 1998)) [emphasis in original].
6 Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp., 231 N.J. 234, 250 (N.J. 2017) (quoting Estate
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compensation insurance for volunteer firefighters and other
volunteers. 7 More broadly, it “embodies ‘an historic “trade-off”
whereby employees relinquish their right to pursue common-law
remedies in exchange for prompt and automatic entitlement to
benefits for work-related injuries.’” 8
The mandate of the New Jersey Law Revision Commission
(“Commission”) is broad in scope, calling for consideration of
“the general and permanent statutory law of this State and the
judicial decisions construing it” to discover “defects and
anachronisms therein, and to prepare and submit to the
Legislature” bills designed to remedy defects, reconcile conflicts,
clarify confusing language, and eliminate redundancies. 9 The
Commission is further called on to engage in “a continuous
revision of the general and permanent” statutes and to maintain
them “in revised, consolidated and simplified form.” 10
There are times when the Commission works in related areas
of law across multiple projects. That is the case with the efforts
here in the employment law area. Some of these efforts are
highlighted below by a discussion of the Commission’s
recommendations in the areas of tenure, unemployment benefits,
temporary disability benefits, and the workers’ compensation
medical provider statute of limitations.
II.
A.

SELECTED COMMISSION WORK IN THE AREA OF
EMPLOYMENT LAW

Clarification of Tenure

New Jersey law provides tenure for teaching staff members
and other educational employees, including secretaries, assistant
secretaries, school business administrators, business managers,
and clerical employees. 11 Certain identified school employees
of Kotsovska ex rel. Kotsovska v. Liebman, 221 N.J. 568, 584 (N.J. 2015) (quoting
N.J.S.A. § 34:15-7)).
7 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-75 (2022); Kocanowski v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 237
N.J. 3, 11 (2019).
8 Mull v. Zeta Consumer Prod., 176 N.J. 385, 390 (N.J. 2003).
9 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1:12A-8 (2016).
10
11

Id.
See generally N.J. L. Revision Comm’n, FINAL REPORT RELATING

TO

CLARIFICATION OF TENURE ISSUES (Feb. 20, 2020) [hereinafter NJLRC FEB. 20, 2020
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can obtain tenure through N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2. 12 In its current
form, N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 does not comprehensively address the
tenure rights of the non-teaching school employees even though
the law covers the non-teaching employees in transfer and
promotion situations. 13
Decisions in several cases identified potential gaps in the law,
including DiNapoli v. Board of Education of the Township of
Verona, 14 Given v. East Windsor Regional School District, 15 and
Colon-Serrano v. Plainfield Board of Education. 16 In these cases,
the courts considered the school secretaries’ abilities to retain
tenure rights. 17
In DiNapoli, the Appellate Division held that a secretary
forfeited her tenure rights when she was voluntarily reassigned to
a non-secretarial position with the same employer. 18 The new
position was abolished after more than three years, and DiNapoli
argued that she should have been able to “bump” a non-tenured
secretary and reacquire her old position. 19 The court disagreed,
explaining that “the Legislature did not intend to afford
secretaries tenure preservation upon transfer or promotion from
secretarial employment.” 20 In Given, however, where a tenured
school clerk accepted a separately tenurable secretary position
and later involuntarily returned to her clerk position, 21 the court
determined that while the employee did not automatically obtain
tenure as a secretary, she did retain her tenure as a clerk. 22 In
REVISED FINAL REPORT].
12 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:17-2 (2021).
13 NJLRC FEB. 20, 2020 REVISED FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 1–2.
14 See generally DiNapoli v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Verona, 434 N.J.
Super. 233 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).
15 N.J. Dep’t of Educ., Given v. East Windsor Regional School District, 1978
S.L.D., in N.J. SCH. L. DECISIONS, 43 (1978), https://www.njstatelib.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/1978_Volume_1.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
16 See generally Colon-Serrano v. Plainfield Bd. of Educ., No. 357-10/06, 2007
N.J. AGEN LEXIS 808 (N.J. Adm. Dec. 13, 2007).
17 NJLRC FEB. 20, 2020 REVISED FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 2.
18 DiNapoli, 434 N.J. Super. at 245–46.
19 Id. at 234–35, 240.
20 Id. at 242.
21 See N.J. Dep’t of Educ., Given v. East Windsor Regional School District, 1978
S.L.D., in N.J. SCH. L. DECISIONS, 44–45 (1978), https://www.njstatelib.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/1978_Volume_1.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2022).
22 See id. at 45.
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Colon-Serrano, a tenured attendance aide was found to have
forfeited tenure rights upon promotion to a non-clerical, nontenurable position with the same employer. 23
The Commission began a project in this area to clarify
N.J.S.A.18 A:17-2, and to create a uniform statutory scheme that
reconciles the potentially disparate statutory treatment of tenure
for teaching and non-teaching employees. 24
As tenure rights have expanded in New Jersey, the statutes
applying these rights to various employees “were not always
made consistent[ly].” 25 N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2 is silent about the
movement of employees from one position to another, but
N.J.S.A. 18A:28-5 and -6, pertaining to the tenure of teaching
staff members, contain language regarding the movement or
transfer of those employees. 26
N.J.S.A. 18A:17-20.4 and N.J.S.A. 18A:17-20.5, 27 which
pertain to the tenure rights of superintendents and
administrative principals respectively, also provided guidance to
the Commission in considering the proposed changes to N.J.S.A.
18A:17-2. Although superintendent and administrative principal
positions are not tenurable, the tenure rights for positions held
by an individual for positions below those positions are retained
by the individual. 28 This means that if an individual loses their
superintendent or administrative principal position, they may
resume a previously tenured position. 29

23 Colon-Serrano v. Plainfield Bd. of Educ., No. 357-10/06, 2007 N.J. AGEN
LEXIS 808 at *1–2 (N.J. Admin. Dec. 13, 2007).
24 See NJLRC FEB. 20, 2020 REVISED FINAL REPORT, supra note 11.
25 NJLRC FEB. 20, 2020 REVISED FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 4.
26 NJLRC FEB. 20, 2020 REVISED FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 4–5.
27 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:17-20.4 (2013). For example, entitled “Effect on preexisting tenure rights; tenure rights of superintendent promoted from within
district,” states that: “Nothing in this section or in this act shall affect any tenure
rights which shall have already accrued to any superintendent prior to the effective
date of this amendatory and supplementary act. A superintendent of schools
promoted from within a district shall retain all tenure rights accrued in any position
which was previously held by the superintendent in the district.” Id.
28 NJLRC FEB. 20, 2020 REVISED FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 7.
29 NJLRC FEB. 20, 2020 REVISED FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 7.
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Guided by the language in these statutes, the Commission
recommended adding an additional subsection to N.J.S.A.
18A:17-2. 30 Although the statutory language pertaining to tenure
for secretarial and clerical positions does not contain a tenure
retention provision like that found in the statutes concerning
superintendents and administrative principals, it was unclear to
the Commission that the Legislature intended to disadvantage
other non-teaching staff. 31 As a result, the Commission proposed
language to protect the tenure rights of secretarial,
administrative, and clerical employees who change from one
position to another but remain within the same job category. 32
The Revised Final Report released by the Commission in
February 2020 included a proposed new subsection (d) in
N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2. Subsection (d)(1) states that a person who is
tenured or eligible to obtain tenure, and “[w]ho is transferred or
promoted to another position covered by” the chapter, “shall not
obtain tenure in the new position until after meeting the specific
tenure requirements for the new position.” 33 Subsection (d)(2)
states, in part, that if the person is transferred or promoted to a
position covered by the chapter, “but is terminated before tenure
is obtained therein, and who has tenure in the same district and
under the same chapter,” then that person “shall be returned to
the former position at the salary which would have been received
had the transfer or promotion not occurred.” 34 Proposed
subsection (e) states that a person who is tenured or eligible to
obtain tenure, but “[w]ho is voluntarily transferred or promoted
from the tenured position, to a position that is not tenureeligible, or to a position that is covered by another chapter,
forfeits tenure” of their prior position. 35
During the course of its work in this area, the Commission
sought knowledgeable and interested parties before tendering its
Final Report, including the New Jersey Association of School
Administrators (“NJASA”), the New Jersey School Board
30
31
32
33
34
35

NJLRC FEB. 20, 2020 REVISED FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 8–10.
NJLRC FEB. 20, 2020 REVISED FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 7–8.
NJLRC FEB. 20, 2020 REVISED FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 8.
NJLRC FEB. 20, 2020 REVISED FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 11.
NJLRC FEB. 20, 2020 REVISED FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 11.
NJLRC FEB. 20, 2020 REVISED FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 11–12 .

THARNEY, SILVER, SCHLIMBACH, WHITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

5/18/2022 9:10 PM

TENURE, UNEMPLOYMENT, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

267

Association (“SBA”), the New Jersey Principals and Supervisors
Association (“NJPSA”), the New Jersey Department of Education
(“NJDE”), and the New Jersey branch of the American
Federation of Teachers (“NJAFT”). 36
The SBA offered favorable comments and support for the
proposed modification to N.J.S.A. 18A:17-2, finding that the
proposed language clarifies the limits of secretarial tenure and is
preferable to the existing language in the statute. The SBA
indicated, however, that it supports renewable contracts with
school district staff regarding tenure. 37 The Commission did not
receive any comments in opposition to the Report. 38
B.

Unemployment Benefits When an Offer is Rescinded

In New Jersey, eligibility for unemployment compensation is
governed by the Unemployment Compensation Law (“UCL”). 39
Generally, voluntarily leaving a position causes an individual to
be disqualified from unemployment benefits until they are reemployed for eight weeks. 40 A 2015 amendment to N.J.S.A.
43:21-5(a), however, excluded from disqualification individuals
who accept new employment that “commences not more than
seven days” 41 after leaving their prior employment. 42 However,
the amendment does not indicate how eligibility for
unemployment benefits is affected if a job offer is rescinded
before the start date of the new employment, and within the
statute’s seven-day window.

NJLRC FEB. 20, 2020 REVISED FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 8.
NJLRC FEB. 20, 2020 REVISED FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 8.
38 NJLRC FEB. 20, 2020 REVISED FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 9.
39 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-1 (2018).
40 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(a) (2018) (mentioning an individual is disqualified
from unemployment benefits until they earn at least ten times their weekly benefit
rate, as determined on a case-by-case basis).
41 McClain v. Bd. of Rev., Dep’t of Lab., 237 N.J. 445, 450–51 (2019) (“[t]he
Legislature recognized the inequity facing those employees who served a substantial
period with one employer and then voluntarily left for an equal or better
opportunity with another employer, only to be terminated shortly afterwards.”).
42 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(a) (2018) (providing that in addition to
commencing within seven days, the new employment must have “weekly hours or
pay not less than the hours or pay of the employment of the first employer”).
36
37
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This question was addressed by McClain v. Board of Review,
Department of Labor. 43 The New Jersey Supreme Court held

that an individual who leaves employment voluntarily for a new
position commencing within seven days, and whose job offer is
rescinded before the start date of their new position through no
fault of their own, is entitled to unemployment compensation
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). 44
McClain is a consolidated appeal involving two appellants
(McClain and Blake), both of whom accepted new positions
scheduled to begin within seven days of leaving their prior
employment, and both of whom had employers rescind the offers
before the start date through no fault of the appellants. 45 The
Deputy Director of Unemployment Insurance denied both
appellants’ claims for unemployment compensation. 46
The
Appeal Tribunals affirmed the denials and the Board of Review
(“Board”) affirmed as well. 47 Before separate appellate panels,
McClain succeeded 48 and Blake did not. 49 Both the Board and
Blake, respectively, appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court
and the cases were consolidated as McClain v. Board of Review,
Department of Labor. 50
43
44
45

See McClain, 237 N.J. at 461.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 461. McClain, a preschool teacher, and Blake, a cook, both accepted

new positions scheduled to begin within seven days of resigning their prior
employment. McClain’s job offer was rescinded the day after she resigned her prior
employment, and Blake’s was rescinded two days before she was scheduled to start
her new employment. Id. at 452–53. McClain’s offer was rescinded because the
teacher she was hired to replace returned to her position and Blake’s offer was
rescinded because the organization decided to hire someone else in her stead. Id.
46 McClain, 237 N.J. at 453.
47 Id. at 453 (holding that eligibility for unemployment compensation required
individuals actually commence employment within seven days of leaving prior
employment and the Board affirmed).
48 Id. at 454 (holding that the statute’s plain language required only that an
individual accept an offer of employment scheduled to begin within seven days
because the remedial purpose of the statute’s 2015 amendment supported this
interpretation).
49 Id. at 454–55 (interpreting the statute to require an individual to actually
begin working within the seven-day window, by relying on a Senate Labor
Committee report which indicated the 2015 amendment was intended to help
employees who had voluntarily left their employment only to be laid off from new
employment after starting).
50 Id. at 451.
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Before the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Board argued
that unemployment compensation was available only to those
who actually began working within the seven-day period. 51 The
appellants argued that the statute permitted unemployment
compensation so long as the applicant accepted the job offer and
was scheduled to start within seven days of leaving the prior
position. 52 The McClain Court found that the statute could
plausibly be interpreted both ways, and reviewed the legislative
history of the statute. 53
Finding the legislative history ambiguous, the court
determined that the language in N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) should be
“liberally construed in favor of claimants to effectuate [the
UCL’s] remedial purposes” as social legislation designed to
provide financial relief to individuals unemployed through no
fault of their own. 54 The McClain court found that the appellants
were entitled to unemployment compensation benefits because
“(1) they qualified for UI benefits at their former employment at
the time of their departure, (2) they were scheduled to
commence their new jobs within seven days of leaving their
former employment, and (3) their new job offers were rescinded
through no fault of their own before the start date.” 55
As a part of its work in this area, the Commission sought
feedback from knowledgeable stakeholders and organizations
regarding proposed modifications to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) to
address the concerns raised by the McClain Court. 56 The
Employers Association of New Jersey, the National Employment
Lawyers’ Association—New Jersey (“NELA”), and the New Jersey
State Bar Association Labor and Employment Law Section
(“NJSBA LELS”) all expressed support for the Commission’s
McClain v. Bd. of Rev., Dep’t of Lab., 237 N.J. 445, 458 (2019).
Id. at 459.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 460–61 (citing Brady v. Bd. of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 212 (1997)).
55 McClain, 237 N.J. at 462.
56 See N.J. L. Revision Comm’n, FINAL REPORT REGARDING UNEMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS WHEN AN OFFER OF EMPLOYMENT IS RESCINDED, at 4 (June 17, 2021),
[hereinafter NJLRC JUNE 2021 FINAL REPORT] (other individuals and organizations
from whom comments were sought include New Jersey Workforce Development,
Professor Timothy Glynn of Seton Hall University School of Law, and the attorneys
for the Plaintiffs in McClain).
51
52
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proposed clarification. 57
The NELA suggested (1) increasing the timeframe in the
statute from seven to ten days and (2) expressly stating that the
prior employer’s unemployment account should not be charged
in situations covered by the modification. 58 The NJSBA LELS
recommended preserving the seven-day timeframe and
modifying a different section, N.J.S.A. 43:21-7(c)(1), 59 to make
clear that neither the old nor new employer’s unemployment
accounts would be charged in the circumstances contemplated by
McClain. 60
After considering these comments, the Commission released
a Tentative Report in February 2021 that proposed
incorporating the holding of McClain into N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) as
a new subsection and adding language to N.J.S.A. 43:21-7(c)(1)
to make clear that neither employer’s unemployment account
would be charged in situations covered by the proposed
modifications to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). 61
The Commission again sought comments during the period
following its release of the Tentative Report. In response, the
NELA expressed its support for the proposed revisions but said
that eligibility should include any circumstance in which an
employee was scheduled to begin new employment but did not,
or at least extended to those whose new employment was
rescinded or delayed by the employer through no fault of the
employee. 62 The NJSBA LELS suggested that the clarification in
N.J.S.A. 43:21-7(c)(1) should be included in the Comments to

NJLRC JUNE 2021 FINAL REPORT, supra note 56 at 4.
NJLRC JUNE 2021 FINAL REPORT, supra note 56 at 4.
59 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-7 (2021) (entitled “Contributions,” this section
governs contributions to unemployment compensation accounts by employers).
60 See NJLRC JUNE 2021 FINAL REPORT, supra note 56 at 4.
61 NJLRC JUNE 2021 FINAL REPORT, supra note 56 at 4. The timeframe change
suggested by the NELA was not accepted by the Commission because the
“proposals represent an express change in the statute’s substance and are not
merely a codification of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding in McClain v. Bd.
of Review, Dep’t of Lab[.] or the clarification of an ambiguity.” NJLRC JUNE 2021
FINAL REPORT, supra note 56 at 7. Given the Commission’s concern “about the
ramification of such substantive revisions,” consideration of that proposed change
was left to the Legislature. NJLRC JUNE 2021 FINAL REPORT, supra note 56 at 7.
62 NJLRC JUNE 2021 FINAL REPORT, supra note 56 at 5.
57
58
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that section, as well as in the statutory text. 63
In June 2021, the Commission released its Final Report
recommending that N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), which was originally a
single paragraph, be divided into four subsections. 64 The
Commission reformatted the first two subsections without
changing their content, and the Commission made minor
modifications to the fourth subsection to reflect proposed
changes to the statute pursuant to McClain. 65
The third subsection–(a)(3)–incorporated the holding of
McClain, excluding from disqualification those who voluntarily
leave their employment for a qualifying position that either
begins within seven days or “is scheduled to commence not more
than seven days after the individual leaves employment with the
first employer, but the offer of employment from the second
employer is rescinded prior to the start date through no fault of
the individual.” 66
Finally, the Commission recommended that N.J.S.A. 43:217(c)(1) be modified to clarify that neither the first nor the second
employer’s unemployment accounts are charged when an
employee makes a claim pursuant to modified subsection
N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)(3). 67
The Final Report by the Commission recommended
modifications to the UCL that reflect the holding in McClain,
which embodied the court’s conclusion that individuals in the
same situation as the McClain appellants “fall within the category
NJLRC JUNE 2021 FINAL REPORT, supra note 56 at 5.
See NJLRC JUNE 2021 FINAL REPORT, supra note 56 at 6.
65 NJLRC JUNE 2021 FINAL REPORT, supra note 56 at 6 (The first subsection–
(a)(1)–sets forth the conditions for disqualification from unemployment benefits,
and the second–(a)(2)–specifies that the subsection applies to certain agricultural
workers. The fourth subsection–(a)(4)–states that, when an employer terminates an
employee prior to the date the employee specified as the last day of employment,
the seven-day timeframe commences from the employee’s specified date rather
than the date of termination.).
66 NJLRC JUNE 2021 FINAL REPORT, supra note 56 at 6.
67 NJLRC JUNE 2021 FINAL REPORT, supra note 56 at 7 (The proposed language
in N.J.S.A.43:21-7(c)(1) is as follows: “Neither the first nor the second employer’s
account shall be charged for benefits paid to a claimant if the claimant’s
employment by the first or the second employer was ended in any way which,
pursuant to subsection (a) of R.S. 43:21-5, would have disqualified the claimant for
benefits if the claimant had not satisfied the conditions set forth in paragraph (3) of
that subsection to qualify for benefits.”).
63
64
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of workers the Legislature intended to protect by the [2015]
amendment” to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). 68
In response to the Commission’s work in this area, identical
bills adding language to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)(1) that reflects the
holding in McClain were introduced in November 2021 in the
Senate and the Assembly of the New Jersey Legislature and were
referred to the Senate and Assembly Labor Committees. 69 The
bills were reintroduced in the legislative session that began in
early 2022, and have been referred to the Senate and Assembly
Labor Committees, respectively. 70
The bills expand
unemployment benefits to “an individual who leaves work with
the first employer upon receipt of an offer of employment from
another employer to commence not more than 10 days after the
individual leaves work, but the offer is rescinded through no fault
of the individual.” 71
C.

Temporary Disability Benefits

New Jersey’s Workers’ Compensation Act 72 (“the Act”)
provides workers’ compensation benefits for a range of
individuals engaged in voluntary services. 73
Since those
McClain v. Bd. of Rev., Dep’t of Lab., 237 N.J. 445, 462 (2019).
S.B. 4138, 2020 Leg., 219th Sess. (N.J. 2021); A.B. 6066, 2020 Leg., 219th
Sess. (N.J. 2021).
70 S.B. 1606, 2022 Leg., 220th Sess. (N.J. 2022); A.B. 1316, 2022 Leg., 220th
Sess. (N.J. 2022).
71 S.B. 1606, 2022 Leg., 220th Sess. (N.J. 2022) (also proposing to increase the
allowable time from leaving previous employment and starting new employment
from seven to ten days).
72 N.J. REV. STAT. § 34:15-1 et seq.
73 N.J. REV. STAT. § 34:15-75 (2013).
This provision of the Act pertains to
compensation for injury and death to certain volunteers and other workers. It
provides:
Compensation for injury and death, either or both, of any
volunteer fireman, county fire marshal, assistant county fire
marshal, volunteer first aid or rescue squad worker, volunteer
driver of any municipally-owned or operated ambulance, forest
fire warden or forest fire fighter employed by the State of New
Jersey, member of a board of education, special reserve or
auxiliary policeman doing volunteer public police duty under the
control or supervision of any commission, council or any other
governing body of any municipality, emergency management
volunteer doing emergency management service, health care
workers, public health workers and support services personnel
68
69
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individuals are volunteering at the time of their injury or death,
the Act provides that the compensation paid will “[b]e based on a
weekly salary or compensation conclusively presumed to be
received by such person in an amount sufficient to entitle him,
or, in the event of his death, his dependents, to receive the
maximum compensation by this chapter authorized.” 74
When it considered the case of Kocanowski v. Township of
Bridgewater, 75 the New Jersey Supreme Court identified
language in the Act pertaining to compensation for volunteers
that it considered to be unclear. 76
In Kocanowski, Jennifer Kocanowski was a volunteer
firefighter who responded, along with other volunteer
firefighters, to a multi-alarm fire where she sustained injuries
while performing her firefighting duties. 77 As a result of her
injuries, which included a broken fibula, a severely damaged
ankle, and torn ligaments, Kocanowski required multiple
surgeries and numerous medical treatments. 78 She was unable to
return to work as a volunteer firefighter or to her previously held
paid positions “as a nanny or a home health aide.” 79
registered with the Emergency Health Care Provider Registry
pursuant to section 6 of P.L.2005, c. 222 (C.26:13-6) and doing
emergency management service for the State, or any volunteer
worker for the Division of Parks and Forestry, the Division of Fish
and Wildlife, the New Jersey Natural Lands Trust or the New
Jersey Historic Trust, shall:
a. Be based upon a weekly salary or compensation conclusively
presumed to be received by such person in an amount sufficient
to entitle him, or, in the event of his death, his dependents, to
receive the maximum compensation by this chapter authorized;
and [. . .] shall:
b. Not be subject to the seven-day waiting period provided in R.S.
34:15-14.

74
75

Id.
See Kocanowski v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 237 N.J. 3, 10–14 (2019) (holding

that the “weekly salary or compensation” language in N.J.S.A.34:15-75 was unclear
and this section “was intended to grant all volunteer firefighters the maximum
compensation allowed, regardless of current or pervious income.”).
76 N.J. L. Revision Comm’n, FINAL REP. REGARDING TEMP. DISABILITY BENEFITS
TO CERTAIN VOLUNTEERS AND OTHER WORKERS PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A.34:15-75, at 2
(Jan. 21, 2021) [hereinafter NJLRC JAN. 2021 FINAL REPORT].
77 Kocanowski, 237 N.J. at 6.
78
79

See id.
Id. at 6–7.
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The Division of Workers’ Compensation judge denied
Kocanowski’s claim for temporary disability benefits pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 34:15-75 on the grounds that temporary disability
benefits were intended as a replacement for wages, and
Kocanowski did not have outside employment or any other
source of income when she sustained her injuries. 80
A volunteer firefighter for approximately seventeen years at
the time of injury, Kocanowski had taken a leave of absence from
her paid employment to provide care for her dying father and
then her ill mother. 81
The New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the denial of
Kocanowski’s benefits claim, explaining that “pre-injury outside
employment is a necessary predicate to awarding temporary
disability benefits to volunteer firefighters” and that proof of lost
income must be provided in support of a claim. 82 The New
Jersey Supreme Court granted Kocanowski’s petition for
certification. 83
As noted above, N.J.S.A. 34:15-75 provides that a
compensation award is “based upon a weekly salary or
compensation conclusively presumed to be received by such
person in an amount sufficient to entitle him . . . to receive the
maximum compensation by this chapter authorized.” 84 The
statutory reference was subject to competing interpretations in
Kocanowski 85 and, as a result, the court examined extrinsic
sources, including the legislative history of the statute. 86
The Workers’ Compensation Act was enacted in 1911 and
amended in 1931, when the requirement that every municipality
and fire district provide workers’ compensation insurance for

80
81
82
83
84
85

Id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
Kocanowski, 237 N.J. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Kocanowski, 237 N.J. at 9. The Plaintiff argued that based upon the statutory

history of the Act, the requirement that temporary disability benefits be awarded
only to replace lost wages does not apply to volunteer firefighters. Id. The
Defendant argued that these benefits were intended to replace lost wages and are
thus unavailable to unemployed, volunteer firefighters. Id.
86 Id. at 9–10.
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volunteer firefighters was first added to the statute. 87 In its
original
form,
N.J.S.A.
34:15-75
explicitly
provided
compensation for “volunteer firefighters who did not have
ordinary wages or salaries or who were unemployed at the time of
their injury,” stating that compensation would “be ascertained
and paid upon the basis of the weekly compensation last received
by such person when so employed.” 88 The statute was changed to
its current form in 1952. 89
In Kocanowski, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized
the important role that volunteer firefighters play and the intent
of the New Jersey Legislature to encourage their work through
protective legislation. 90 The court indicated that after years of
expanding the protections afforded to volunteer firefighters, it
would be “incongruous and inconsistent . . . for the Legislature to
abruptly limit the class of [volunteers] who qualify for temporary
disability from any volunteer firefighter who had ever been
employed to only [those] employed at the time of injury.” 91 The
court also indicated that N.J.S.A. 34:15-75 should not be a
barrier to temporary disability coverage. 92
The court determined that the language of N.J.S.A. 34:1538, which provides the method of calculating compensation for
temporary disability, was in existence and did not bar benefits to
unemployed firefighters under the pre-1952 version of N.J.S.A.
34:15-75, and it was unwilling to read the statute to bar them in
the Kocanowski case. 93
The court added that volunteer
firefighters injured while performing their volunteer duties “were
at work, [are] unable to continue at work and . . . are unable to
[return to] work” 94 and requiring outside employment in order to
receive compensation would lead to an absurd result because
firefighters, whether employed or unemployed, take the same

87
88

Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 11 (citing L. 1931, c. 172, § 2 (1931) (current version at N.J. REV. STAT.

§ 34:15-75)).
89
90
91
92
93
94

Kocanowski, 237 N.J. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
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risks. 95
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate
Division’s decision and remanded the matter to the Division of
Workers’ Compensation for an award of benefits to Kocanowski,
concluding that the 1952 amendment to N.J.S.A. 34:15-75 “was
intended to grant all volunteer firefighters the maximum
compensation allowed, regardless of current or previous
income.” 96
The Commission undertook work in this area to determine
whether the language of the current statute accurately reflects the
intent of the Legislature and whether modification to clarify
volunteers’ eligibility for benefits regardless of paid employment
would be useful. 97
The Commission’s proposed modifications to N.J.S.A. 34:1575 eliminate the statutory language indicating that compensation
shall be based on a weekly salary or compensation presumed
received and, instead, state that the listed volunteers injured or
killed as a result of their volunteer duties shall receive “the
maximum compensation authorized” by the chapter “regardless
of his or her outside employment status at the time of injury.” 98
The proposed modifications also render the statute genderneutral. 99
In connection with its work in this area, the Commission
sought comments from knowledgeable individuals and
organizations, including the Workers’ Compensation Section of
the New Jersey State Bar Association; the Police and Firemen’s
Retirement System of New Jersey; the New Jersey Council on
Safety and Health; the New Jersey Compensation Association;
the Department of Labor and Workforce Development; the
Director of the Division of Workers’ Compensation; the New
Jersey Self-Insurers Association; and private practitioners. 100

95 Kocanowski, 237 N.J. at 14 (2019) (such an interpretation would allow a
volunteer firefighter working for a de minimis salary to receive the maximum
compensation while an unemployed volunteer would receive none).
96
97
98
99
100

Id.

NJLRC JAN. 2021 FINAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 2.
NJLRC JAN. 2021 FINAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 8.
NJLRC JAN. 2021 FINAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 8.
NJLRC JAN. 2021 FINAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 6.
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Comments Opposing a Change to the Statute

One commenter suggested that N.J.S.A. 34:15-75 is neither
vague nor opaque, and does not need clarification. 101 It was
noted, however, that the doctrine set forth in Cunningham v.
Atlantic States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 102 which provides that a
claimant is only entitled to temporary disability benefits after
termination for cause upon a showing of lost wages due to injury,
has been applied inconsistently in workers’ compensation cases. 103
The Cunningham doctrine, moreover, has “wreaked havoc in the
Division of Workers Compensation since it was decided,” 104 which
is an issue of “great moment” to the Compensation Bar. 105
2.

Comments in Support of the Commission’s
Proposed Change to the Statute

The members of the Workers’ Compensation Section of the
New Jersey State Bar Association (“NJSBA”) reviewed the
Commission’s Report and agreed that “changes to the Workers’
Compensation Act are necessary to clarify the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s conclusion in Kocanowski[,]” and that “the
Legislature intended to grant volunteer workers the maximum
compensation allowed, regardless of current or previous
income.” 106 The NJSBA commenters said that the recommended
changes “provide that clarification, consistent with the court’s
decision.” 107

101 E-mail from Richard Rubenstein, Esq., Rothenberg Rubenstein Berliner &
Shinrod, LLC, to Samuel M. Silver, Deputy Dir., New Jersey Law Revision Comm’n
(Oct. 27, 2020, 15:28 EST) (on file with the NJLRC).
102 Cunningham v. Atl. States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 386 N.J. Super. 423, 425 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (holding that a claimant would be entitled to temporary
disability benefits after termination for cause upon showing of lost wages due to
injury).
103 Rubenstein, supra note 101.
104 Rubenstein, supra note 101.
105 E-mail from Richard Rubenstein, Esq., Rothenberg Rubenstein Berliner &
Shinrod, LLC, to Samuel M. Silver, Deputy Dir., New Jersey Law Revision
Commission (Oct. 27, 2020, 15:41 EST) (on file with the NJLRC).
106 Letter from Kimberly A. Yonta, President of the New Jersey State Bar
Association, to Samuel M. Silver, Deputy Dir., New Jersey Law Revision Comm’n,
*1 (Dec. 14, 2020) (on file with the NJLRC).
107

Id.
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Counsel for Jennifer Kocanowski in the appeal before the
New Jersey Supreme Court also supplied comments indicating
that he “fully support[ed] the amendment of the statute . . . to
comport with the Supreme Court’s landmark decision.” 108
After the release of the Commission’s Final Report, a bill was
introduced in the Assembly proposing modification of N.J.S.A.
34:15-75 consistent with the Commission’s recommendations,
and it was subsequently reintroduced in the 2022-23 legislative
session in both the Assembly and the Senate. 109

Workers Compensation and Disputed Medical Provider
Claims

D.

In 2012, the New Jersey Legislature amended N.J.S.A.
34:15-15 and vested the Division of Workers’ Compensation (the
“Division”) with “[e]xclusive jurisdiction for any disputed medical
charge arising from any claim for compensation for a workrelated injury or illness.” 110 Despite this modification, uncertainty
regarding the statute of limitations for such claims formed the
basis of the legal action in Plastic Surgery Center, PA v. Malouf

Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc. 111
In Plastic Surgery Center, PA, numerous medical providers

filed petitions seeking payment for services rendered to the
injured employees of each defendant-employer. 112 Each petition
was filed more than two years from the date of the patient’s
108 E-Mail from Galen W. Booth, Esq., Att’y for Jennifer Kocanowski, to Samuel
M. Silver, Deputy Dir., New Jersey Law Revision Comm’n (Oct. 27, 2020, 16:34
EST) (on file with the NJLRC).
109 See A6065, 219th Leg., Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2021); A1315, 220th Leg., Ann.
Sess. (N.J. 2022); S1548, 220th Leg., Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2022).
110 See Plastic Surgery Ctr., PA v. Malouf Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., 457 N.J.
Super. 565, 571 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 2019) (finding omission of language
from draft final bill to provide for procedures to resolve disputed medical claims
confirmed Legislature’s belief that claims were subject to statute of limitations in
N.J.S.A. § 34:15-51).
111 Id. at 568.
112 Id. (stating that the five cases on appeal each set forth a common issue). The
Appellate Division consolidated these appeals for purposes of addressing the
statute of limitations issue. Id. In the interest of judicial economy, Appellate
Division omitted the specific facts of each case. Id. The overview set forth herein is
modeled upon the statement of facts and procedural history fashioned by the
appellate panel. Id.
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accident, but less than six years from the accrual of the claim. 113
The compensation judge interpreted the statute of limitations in
N.J.S.A. 34:15-51 to require “every claimant,” including medical
providers, to file a petition with the Division within two years of
the date of the injured worker’s accident. 114 As a result, the
compensation judge determined that each of the medical
provider’s actions had been filed beyond the statute of limitations
and dismissed them. 115 The medical providers appealed. 116
The New Jersey Appellate Division, in Plastic Surgery
Center, PA, determined whether “through its silence, the
Legislature intended—via [the] 2012 amendment—to apply the
two-year statute of limitations, . . . contained in the Workers’
Compensation Act [to disputed medical claims] . . . or whether
the Legislature intended to leave things as they were and
continue to apply the six-year statute of limitations for suits on
contracts.” 117 The court acknowledged the Division’s exclusive
jurisdiction over all disputed medical provider claims arising
from compensation for a work-related injury. 118 However, the
court was persuaded that the six-year statute of limitations
applied to these claims because the “Legislature did not simply
express that the Act’s two-year time bar would apply to medicalprovider claims.” 119
The court rejected the assertion that every claimant for
compensation is governed by the Act’s two-year statute of
limitations and suggested that “if the Legislature intended such a
sea change it would have done so directly, not inferentially.” 120
Since the “Legislature failed to explain or express itself on this
precise issue,” the court could not conclude that “it intended to
so drastically alter existing legal principles.” 121

113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Plastic Surgery Ctr., PA, 457 N.J. Super. at 568.
Id.
Id. at 568–69.
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id.
Plastic Surgery Ctr., PA, 457 N.J. Super. at 571.
Id. at 571.
Id.

THARNEY, SILVER, SCHLIMBACH, WHITE (DO NOT DELETE)

280

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

5/18/2022 9:10 PM

[Vol. 46:2

The Appellate Division rejected the reasoning of the
compensation court and stated that “[i]f anything, the belief that
the Legislature was already satisfied with existing procedural
requirements for these claims more logically suggests it intended
that the six-year statute of limitations, which undoubtedly
applied to medical-provider claims prior to the amendment,
would continue to apply after the amendment was enacted.” 122
The Appellate Division found it compelling “that the
Legislature made no alteration to N.J.S.A. 34:15-51 when it
amended N.J.S.A. 34:15-15.” 123 The court reasoned that the
word “claimant” in the phrase “every claimant for compensation”
in N.J.S.A. 34:15-51 refers to an “employee” and that
“compensation” is defined by the Act “as that to which the
employee is entitled for a work related injury.” 124 The court did
not accept that “every claimant” might include everyone with an
action pending in the Division or that “compensation” could
mean remuneration for medical services provided to an injured
worker. 125
The Appellate Division theorized that a medical provider
may treat an individual for a period longer than two years after
their accident. 126 It posited a situation in which an individual
does not receive treatment until two years after a work-related
injury, and it questioned an interpretation of the statutory
amendment that would mean that “a medical provider’s right to
pursue a legitimate claim might actually be extinguished before it
even accrued.” 127 The court found “nothing but legislative silence
on the point in controversy,” 128 and it rejected the respondent’s
arguments, reversed the judgments of the compensation court,
and remanded each matter for further proceedings concerning
what it termed “timely claims.” 129

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Id. at 572.
Id.
Id.
Plastic Surgery Ctr., PA, 457 N.J. Super. at 572.
Id. at 572−73.
Id. at 573.
Id.at 575.
Id.
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The employers’ petitions for certification were granted by
the New Jersey Supreme Court in May of 2019. 130 In a per
curium opinion, the court affirmed the judgment of the
Appellate Division for the reasons expressed in that court’s
opinion. 131 The court’s three-sentence opinion noted that, in “the
2012 amendment to N.J.S.A. 34:15-15, the Legislature did not
expressly address the statute of limitations.” 132 Regarding the
clarification of the statute, the court said that “[t]he Legislature
is, of course, free to do so in the future.” 133
The Commission released a Final Report proposing several
The Report
statutory modifications in July of 2021. 134
recommends the Legislature amend N.J.S.A. 34:15-15 to include
a statute of limitations for disputed medical provider applications
for payment or reimbursement. 135 The Report does not, however,
recommend a specific period of time within which a medical
provider must bring such a claim, because the length of the
statute of limitations involves policy determinations that are best
suited to the Legislature. 136 To preserve the applications for
payment of medical providers who previously believed, or who
had been advised they had a longer period of time to file such
claims, the Commission recommends the statutory modification
include a “phase-in” period. 137

Plastic Surgery Ctr., PA v. Malouf Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., 457 N.J. Super.
565 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019), certif. granted, 238 N.J. 30, (N.J. 2019) and
cert. granted, 238 N.J. 31 (N.J. 2019) and cert. granted, 238 N.J. 57 (N.J. 2019).
131 Plastic Surgery Center, PA v. Malouf Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., 241 N.J. 112,
113 (N.J. 2020).
130

132
133

Id.
Id.

134 Prior to the release of a Final Report, it is the practice of the Commission to
distribute its work to and seek comments from knowledgeable individuals and
organizations. See N.J. L. Revision Comm’n, FINAL REPORT ADDRESSING THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR MEDICAL PROVIDER CLAIMS IN WORKERS’
COMPENSATION CASES, at 6 (Jul. 15, 2021), https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/596f60f4ebbd1a322db09e45/t/60f735699e1674431cd01c25/1626813802061/w
csolFR071521.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2022) [hereinafter NJLRC JUL. 2021 FINAL
REPORT]. See NJLRC JUL. 2021 FINAL REPORT at 17–18 (covering the Commission’s
treatment of N.J.S.A.34:15-51).
135 NJLRC JUL. 2021 FINAL REPORT, supra note 134, at 14–15.
136 NJLRC JUL. 2021 FINAL REPORT, supra note 134, at 12.
137 NJLRC JUL. 2021 FINAL REPORT, supra note 134, at 14-15.
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A Codified Statute of Limitations

New Jersey’s Workers’ Compensation statutes contain several
statutes of limitations. 138
In response to the Commission’s outreach, commenters
consistently expressed a desire for clear legislative direction
regarding the time frame within which a medical provider must
file a claim in a workers’ compensation action. 139 There was also
universal opposition to the codification of a six-year statute of
limitations for such actions. 140 A two-year, rather than a six-year,
statute of limitations on actions brought by medical providers was
favored by a majority of the responding commenters. 141
2.

Opposition to a Six-Year Statute of Limitations

Commenters provided the Commission with historical,
policy, economic, and practical reasons why the statute of
limitations should not extend beyond two years. The underlying
reasons fell into four categories: (1) medical provider claims are
not typically based on a written contract; (2) efficiency; (3)
economic impact; and (4) the statutes of limitations in
N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-12.6 (2021) (setting period for making
application for “special benefits must be made not later than within one year from
the date of the last payment of compensation to the employee.”); N.J. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 34:15-34 (2021) (addressing the time for claiming compensation for an
occupational disease); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-35-19 (2021) (establishing the
time limitations for the filing of compensation for occupational hearing loss); N.J.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-41 (2021) (setting forth the statute of limitations in cases of
personal injury or death); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-51 (2021) (mandating the
time within which a claimant is required to file a petition for compensation); and
N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-120.28 (2021) (establishing the period of limitations
for filing claims with the receiver, with the insured of an insolvent member, or the
association).
139 Letter from Maeve E. Cannon, Esq., Stevens & Lee, on behalf of Mitchell
International Inc., to Samuel M. Silver, Deputy Dir., N.J. L. Rev. Comm’n at 2
(Aug. 18, 2020) (on file with the NJLRC); Letter from Susan Stryker, Esq., Amery &
Ross, P.C., on behalf of Ins. Council of N.J., to Samuel M. Silver, Deputy Dir., N.J.
L. Rev. Comm’n at 3 (Sept. 29, 2020) (on file with the NJLRC); and letter from Lisa
Chapland, Dir., Gov’t Affairs, N.J. State Bar Ass’n, to Samuel M. Silver, Deputy
Dir., N.J. L. Rev. Comm’n at 1 (Oct. 27, 2020) (on file with the NJLRC).
140 Cannon, supra note 139, at 1, *5; Stryker, supra note 139, at 2; Chapland,
supra note 139, comments at 1.
141 Cannon, supra note 139, at 2, *5; Stryker, supra note 139, at 3; Chapland,
supra note 139, comments at 1.
138
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neighboring states.
i.

Medical Provider Claims Are Not
Typically Based on a Written Contract

In New Jersey, employers and their workers’ compensation
insurers (“payors”) are responsible for reimbursing medical
providers for services provided to injured workers. 142 A payor
may “direct injured covered employees to receive non-emergency
treatment from specified medical providers with whom the payor
has a contractual agreement.” 143 Under those circumstances, the
parties have a pre-existing, mutual agreement regarding the fee
for treatment. In that situation, reimbursement is generally not
an issue.
In the absence of an agreement, a payor is statutorily
responsible for reimbursing a medical provider for services
provided to injured workers in amounts that “shall be reasonable
and based upon the usual fees and charges which prevail in the
same community for similar physicians’, surgeons’[,] and hospital
services.” 144 When the amount is disputed, “the issue typically is
not a contractual one; instead the focus is on what constitutes the
usual, customary, and reasonable charges and the payment that
should be made for a given medical service rendered to an
injured claimant.” 145
Since 2012, when a medical provider disputes the amount
paid by a payor, it may file an application for reimbursement
with the Division of Workers’ Compensation. 146 These claims fall
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Division and serve as the
provider’s exclusive remedy for payment under the statute. 147
N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-15 (2021).
Stryker, supra note 139, at 4.
144 N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-15 (2021).
145 Chapland, supra note 139, at 2 (citing Virginia M. Dietrich, N.J. DEP’T OF
LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., DIV. OF WORKERS’ COMP.: TASK FORCE ON MED. PROVIDER
CLAIMS, at 3 (Nov. 05, 2002)).
146 Chapland, supra note 139, at 2 (citing Virginia M. Dietrich, N.J. DEP’T OF
LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., DIV. OF WORKERS’ COMP.: TASK FORCE ON MED. PROVIDER
CLAIMS, at 3 (Nov. 05, 2002)).
147 Chapland, supra note 139, at 2 (citing VIRGINIA M. DIETRICH, N.J. DEP’T OF
LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., DIV. OF WORKERS’ COMP.: TASK FORCE ON MED. PROVIDER
CLAIMS, at 3 (Nov. 05, 2002)).
142
143
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Medical providers are no longer permitted to file suit in the Law
Division against either payors or claimants. 148
Since “the
Division’s jurisdiction is limited by statute to two years,” it has
been suggested that a six-year statute of limitations would
“impermissibly expand[] the Division’s exclusive, specific and
limited jurisdiction to decide claims for workers’ compensation
benefits arising under the Act.” 149
ii.

Efficiency

Within two years after the date on which the accident
occurred, every claimant for compensation must file a petition
with the Division. 150 While acknowledging that treatment for
serious injuries may continue for significant periods of time,
commenters have noted that “with a six-year limitation period for
provider claims, the compensation courts will be left to
adjudicate provider claims for cases that were resolved many
years before.” 151 Further, some suggest that an extended lookback period “is likely to open the door to a deluge of additional
filings” and significantly delay “injured workers’ claims for
indemnity benefits, for authorization of treatment, and payment
of current medical expenses,” as well as, “increasing the cost
of . . . the administration of claims.” 152
iii.

Economic Impact

In addition to the impact upon the Division, a six-year
statute of limitations may also impact self-insured entities,
insurance companies, and businesses. 153 “A six[-]year statute of
limitations period on provider claims will result in self-insured
Chapland, supra note 139, at 2 (citing VIRGINIA M. DIETRICH, NJ DEP’T OF
LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., DIV. OF WORKER’ COMP.: TASK FORCE ON MED. PROVIDER
CLAIMS, at 3 (2002)). See also Stryker, supra note 139, at 4.
149 Stryker, supra note 139, at 12–13. See also Chapland, supra note 139
(quoting VIRGINIA M. DIETRICH, NJ DEP’T OF LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., DIV. OF
WORKERS’ COMP: TASK FORCE ON MED. PROVIDER CLAIMS, at 6 (NOV. 05, 2002)
(suggesting that once a medical provider has submitted to the jurisdiction of the
Division “the parties must submit to the Rules of the Division.”)).
150 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-51 (2021).
151 Cannon, supra note 139, at 2–3.
152 Stryker, supra note 139, at 12; Chapland, supra note 139, comment at 1.
153 Cannon, supra note 139, at 2–3.
148
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entities . . . as well as insurance companies being required to
manage their reserves over a much longer period of time.” 154
The reserves held against such claims may result in premium
increases for New Jersey businesses and public and private
entities. 155 Additional reserves may also increase an insurer’s
liabilities, and reduce its net worth or surplus, thereby limiting
the amount of insurance it may provide to its insured. 156 In
addition to higher premiums, businesses may experience
difficulties in finding coverage as a result of distorted loss
profiles. 157
Higher reserves will similarly impact self-insureds like public
entities. To maintain a larger reserve, these entities will be
required to devote funds otherwise intended for public purposes
as reserves against potential claims. 158 Alternatively, funds may
have to be used to satisfy higher premiums if a joint insurance
fund is required to reserve additional funds for potential
claims. 159
iv.

Neighboring States

Most of the mid-Atlantic and northeastern states utilize
comprehensive workers’ compensation medical “fee schedules,”
or rely upon statutory or regulatory references to other medical
reimbursement rates. Apart from New Hampshire, these states
do not provide a frame of reference for the issue raised by the
decision in Plastic Surgery Center. 160 New Jersey is one of only
six states that do not use a fee schedule for medical services in
workers’ compensation cases. 161 The others are Indiana, Iowa,
Cannon, supra note 139, at 3.
Cannon, supra note 139, at 3.
156 Cannon, supra note 139, at 3.
157 Cannon, supra note 139, at 3.
158 Cannon, supra note 139, at 3.
159 Cannon, supra note 139, at 2–3.
160 Cannon, supra note 139, at 5; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:21-a (2021)
(“compensation for disability, rehabilitation, medical benefits, or death benefits
under this chapter shall be barred unless a claim is filed within [three] years after
the date of injury”).
161 See Madeline Kasper, MPA, MPH & Jillian Slaight, Ph.D., LEG. ANALYSTS,
LEG. REF. BUREAU: WORKERS’ COMP. LAW IN WISCONSIN, at 5 (Jan. 2018); Stryker,
supra note 139, at 3. See also Angela Childers, States Without Comp Fee Schedules
154
155
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Missouri, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin. 162 The statutes of
limitation in these states range from six months to six years. 163
v.

Statute of Limitations—Starting Point

While the participating commenters all agreed that the
statute of limitations should be less than six years, there was no
consensus regarding when the limitation period should begin.
Participating commenters suggested options focused on a period
of time calculated from (1) the date of the injured worker’s
accident; (2) the date a medical provider receives a payment that
is subsequently disputed; or (3) the date on which the injured
individual receives the service.
a.

The Date of the Accident

The Insurance Council of New Jersey urged the Commission
“to endorse the adoption of a clarifying amendment to the Act
confirming that the Act’s two-year period of limitations applies to
all claims for compensation, including MPCs [medical provider
claims].” 164 Such an amendment is said to be “consistent with
Pay More: WCRI, BUS. INS. (May 19, 2020), https://www.businessinsurance.com/
article/20200519/NEWS08/912334636?template=printart.
162 Childers, supra note 161.
163 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.27 (2021) (stating that per the Dep’t of Workforce
Develop. medical care must first be authorized by an insurer who is then
responsible for payment and disputes are therefore de minimis or non-existent);
WIS. ADMIN. CODE DWD § 80.72 (2021) (stating that a provider shall file a written
request to the department to resolve the dispute within six months after an insurer
or self-insurer first-refuses to pay); MO. ANN. STAT. § 287.140 (2021) (stating that
any application for additional reimbursement “shall be filed not later than . . . one
year from the date the first notice of dispute of the medical charge was received by
the health care provider”); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-7-17(g) (2021) (stating that “a
medical service provider must file an application for adjustment of a claim for a
medical service provider’s fee with the board not later than two (2) years after the
receipt of an initial written communication from the employer, the employer’s
insurance carrier, if any, or an agent acting on behalf of the employer after the
medical service provider submits a bill for services” and uses a fee schedule of sorts
for hospital care); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:21-a (2021) (stating that
compensation for medical benefits “shall be barred unless a claim is filed within
[three] years after the date of injury”); see also Plastic Surgery Ctr., PA v. Malouf
Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., 457 N.J. Super. 565, 572 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019)
(applying a six-year statute of limitations to disputed medical provider claims).
164 Stryker, supra note 139, at 2–3 (emphasis in original).
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established Division practice, law and public policy.” 165
As discussed in Plastic Surgery Center, PA, such a statute of
limitations is not without complications.
Claims for
compensation, as set forth in N.J.S.A. 34:15-51, require “every
claimant for compensation . . . [to] submit to the Division . . . a
petition . . . within two years after the date on which the accident
occurred.” 166 It may not be practical to expect a medical provider
to know the date of the accident, or when the last benefit was
paid. In addition, as noted in Plastic Surgery Center, PA, a
medical provider may treat an individual for a period greater
than two years after an accident. 167
Further, in some
circumstances, an individual may not receive treatment until two
years following a work-related incident. 168 In these situations, the
legislative amendment urged by some of the commenters would
cause “a medical provider’s right to pursue a legitimate claim” to
be “extinguished before it even accrued.” 169
b.

The Date of Payment

The claim period can also begin two years after the payment
was received from the payor. 170 The Commission was asked to
consider language that provided for a “phase-in” period to
permit medical providers, pursuant to the Plastic Surgery Center,
PA decision, to file a petition within the time specified by the
Legislature. 171 Once enacted, the statute of limitations would
require a medical provider to file a dispute “no later than two
years after the date payment was received.” 172
This phase-in language is virtually identical to the language
contained in S764. 173 The proposed statute of limitations would
165
166
167
168
169

Stryker, supra note 139, at 2–3 (emphasis in original).
N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-51 (2013).
See Plastic Surgery Ctr. PA, 457 N.J. Super. at 573.

Id.
Id.

170 Cannon, supra note 139, at 2 (suggesting incorporating a phase-in period
for services rendered before the effective date of the statutory amendment).
171 Cannon, supra note 139, at 2.
172 Cannon, supra note 139, at 2.
173 See S. 764, 218th Leg., Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2018) (identical to A2412, 218th
Leg., Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2018)) (concerning disputed medical fees in workers’
compensation claims and referred to Senate Labor Committee and neither
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theoretically permit a medical provider to bring a disputed claim
six years after the date that a payment is received . A situation
may arise in which a payor neglects to issue a payment to the
medical provider for a number of years. If the medical provider
waited four-and-one-half years before they address this omission,
the plain language of the statute would allow the provider two
years from the date it received payment within which to bring a
claim. Essentially allowing them a six and one-half year statute of
limitations.
c.
The Date of Service
A third option involves calculating the statute of limitations
from the date that a medical provider renders services. 174 A
statute of limitations tied to the date of service would make it
“clear to the medical provider when legal action must be taken if
a dispute arises over payment [or lack thereof,] for services
rendered.” 175 Such a statutory provision would arguably eliminate
the filing of claims by a medical provider long after the
underlying claim has been adjudicated. 176
In response to the Commission’s outreach, the NJSBA
offered favorable comments and the unanimous support of the
Worker’s Compensation Section for the Commission’s proposed
modification to the Workers’ Compensation statutes.177
III.

CONCLUSION

The New Jersey Law Revision Commission, consistent with
its statutory mandate, brings to the attention of the Legislature
areas of New Jersey statutes that would benefit from modification
to support the Legislature in its ongoing efforts to improve New
Jersey’s body of statutory law.

advancing beyond committee referral nor subsequently introduced in the next
legislative session).
174 Chapland, supra note 139, comments at 1.
175 Chapland, supra note 139, comments at 1.
176 Chapland, supra note 139, comments at 1.
177 N.J. L. Revision Comm’n, Minutes NJLRC Meeting (Jul. 15, 2021)
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/596f60f4ebbd1a322db09e45/t/6148c951c33dd
65ced325e42/1632160081918/MIN071521rsr2.pdf.
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Given the substantial number of New Jersey residents
participating in the workforce, the clarity of the laws pertaining
to various aspects of employment is important and worthy of
attention by Commission and the Legislature.

